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Abstract—This paper develops a defender-attacker-defender 
(DAD) model for the resilience optimization of interdependent 
critical infrastructures (CIs) against intentional at-tacks. In the 
outer level, the system defender identifies the components to be 
hardened in order to reduce the damage associated with the 
worst case attack. In the middle level, the attacker disrupts the 
system to inflict maximum damage. In the inner level, the 
defender responds to the attack to minimize the consequence of 
the attack by optimal operation of the system. A recently 
developed decomposition-based two-layer cutting plane 
algorithm is adopted to solve the proposed model. A case of 
interdependent power and water systems is presented to show 
the proposed model 
Keywords-resilience; intentional attacks; interdependent 
critical infrastructures; defender-attacker-defender model; 
optimization 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Modern society relies on the effective functioning of 
critical infrastructures (CIs) such as the power grid, 
transportation network, Internet, water distribution network, 
etc. to provide public services, improve quality of life, 
sustain private profits and spur economic growth. These CIs 
do not exist in isolation of one another – the Internet requires 
electricity, transportation networks often use sophisticated 
control and information systems, the generation of electricity 
requires fuels, and so forth. CIs are physically, 
geographically, cyber and logically dependent and 
interdependent, thus called interdependent CIs [1-5]. The 
interdependencies can improve the operational efficiencies 
of these systems, but they can also create new vulnerabilities 
by providing new hazards and extra channels for failure 
propagation among different CIs, resulting in so-called 
cascading failures [6-8]. By recognizing the significance of 
these issues, many governments and organizations have 
initiated interdependent CIs protection plans aiming at 
improving the resilience of national/regional interdependent 
CIs [9, 10]. Also, in the research field, the number of the 
resilience-related papers has increased exponentially during 
the past decades [11]. 
Albeit no consensus exists for the concept of resilience, it 
is essentially related to the capability of a system to 
withstand, adapt to and quickly recover from the effects of a 
disruptive event [2, 12]. System resilience under a disruptive 
event is mainly affected by its robustness and recovery 
rapidity under this event, where system robustness is 
quantified by the system functionality level immediately 
after the event, and the recovery rapidity describes how 
quickly the system recovers after the event [13]. In this paper, 
we regard improving robustness as the primary strategy for 
system resilience enhancement, and the system recovery 
phase is not considered. 
This paper mainly focuses on the resilience of 
interdependent CIs under intentional attacks. In the literature, 
scholars have studies interdependent CIs system resilience 
under malicious attacks, where the attacks are usually 
modeled as the failure of important components which are 
selected by the local [14-16] or global [3, 17, 18] importance 
metrics of the components. In these approaches, the attack 
strategies and the system protection strategies are not 
affected by each other, i.e. there are no interactions between 
the attackers and the system defenders. The results from 
these models are not necessarily the worst-case disruptions at 
the system level, differing from the principle of worst-case 
analysis highly advocated for the terrorist risk study for CI 
systems [19, 20]. 
Despite the reduced number of studies for interdependent 
CIs under intentional attacks, similar problems have been 
extensively studied for single CIs in the literature. These 
problems usually introduce a virtual attacker who seeks to 
find the most harmful attack strategy to disrupt the system 
and a defender who pursues minimum damage from the 
attack through pre-attack defense and post-attack response. 
The interactions between the attacker and the defender can 
be modeled by a tri-level defender-attacker-defender (DAD) 
framework. The outer level of this model describes how the 
defender optimally protect the system, the middle level 
describes how the attacker disrupts the system to have a 
maximum damage, and the inner level describes how the 
defender responds to the attack to minimize the consequence 
of the attack, e.g., via re-dispatching network flow in an 
electric power grid. This modeling framework has been 
applied to identify the optimum protection strategies for 
electric power grids [21-23], rail systems [24], commodity 
distribution networks [20, 25] and some other CIs [26]. 
Ouyang [27] recently applied the DAD framework for the 
resilience optimization of interdependent CIs under spatially 
localized attacks. 
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In this paper, we adapt the DAD framework for the 
resilience optimization of interdependent CIs against 
intentional attacks, addressing the challenges of modeling 
interdependencies among different CIs and analyzing the 
importance of such interdependencies for system defense. To 
the best of the authors’ knowledge, this has not been studied 
previously. For illustrative purposes, this paper considers 
hardening weak components as the defense strategy to 
enhance system resilience. Yet, other defense strategies that 
can be used to improve interdependent CIs resilience, e.g., 
system expansion by constructing new components, can be 
easily incorporated into the model. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 proposes a detailed formulation of the trilevel 
DAD model for the resilience optimization of interdependent 
CIs under intentional attacks. The methodology adopted for 
the solution of the proposed model is briefly introduced in 
Section 3. Section 4 presents the analysis of the 
computational results obtained from the application to 
interdependent power and water systems. Concluding 
remarks are given in Section 5. 
II. MODEL FORMULATION
This paper uses a network flow-based approach for the 
modeling of interdependent CIs, where each CI is modeled 
as a network and their interdependencies are represented via 
inter-links. Specifically, the set of CIs of concern is denoted 
by ࣄ. Each CI ݇ in ࣄ is modeled by a network ܩ௞(ܰ௞, ܮ௞)
described by a collection of nodes ܰ௞  and edges ܮ௞ . Each 
link ݈ ∈ ܮ௞  in CI network ݇  has an associated capacity ݂௟̅௞
representing the maximal amount of flow that can pass 
through it, while each node ݊ ∈ ܰ௞ has a supply capacity ̅ݏ௡௞
and a required demand መ݀௡௞ of flow for its nominal operation. 
Flow distributes through the CI networks according to the 
flow capacities of the links and supply capacities of the 
nodes, following flow conservation. 
For each CI network, resilience to a disruptive event is 
regarded as the system performance level immediately after 
the event, quantified by the normalized total satisfied 
demand level. Then, the resilience of the interdependent CIs 
under this event is represented by the weighted sum of the 
resilience of each CI network, expressed by 
ܴ = ෍ ቆݓ௞
∑ ݀௡௞௡∈ேೖ
∑ መ݀௡௞௡∈ேೖ
ቇ
௞∈ࣄ
 ????
where ݓ௞  is the weighting factor for the resilience of CI 
network ݇. 
For optimizing interdependent CIs resilience against 
intelligent attacks, a virtual attacker and a defender are 
introduced. The attacker tries to disrupt the system with the 
most destructive attack strategy and the defender seeks the 
ex-ante actions, e.g., protecting weak components, and ex-
post actions, e.g., dispatching system flow, that maximize 
resilience. The interactions between the defender and the 
attacker lead to a three stage DAD model, which includes: 
the first stage, in which the defender makes protection 
decisions pursuing maximum system performance subject to 
a limited protection budget; the second stage, in which the 
attacker minimizes system performance subject to an attack 
budget, and the third stage, in which the defender’s response
aims at maximum system resilience after the attack.
The problem is framed within a three-level max-min-max 
formulation that implements the DAD model. The 
mathematical formulation uses the following notation: 
Index, Sets and Parameters
݇ ∈ ࣄ Set of all CI networks 
݊ ∈ ܰ௞ Set of nodes in network ݇
݈ ∈ ܮ௞ Set of edges in network ݇
݋(݈) Origin or sending node of link ݈
݀(݈) Destination or receiving node of link ݈
ܮ௡
௞,௡௕௥ Set of neighbor links connecting with node ݊ 
in network ݇, i.e., 
ܮ௡
௞,௡௕௥
= {݈|݈ ∈ ܮ௞: ݋(݈) = ݊ or ݀(݈) = ݊} 
̅ݏ௡
௞ Generation capacity at node ݊ in network ݇
݂௟̅
௞ Capacity of link ݈ in CI network ݇
መ݀
௡
௞ Required demand at node ݊ in CI network ݇
ܥ௞ Set of all nodes in network ݇ that depend on 
the nodes of other networks to operate
ܦ௞ Set of all nodes in network ݇ that any other 
network nodes depend on
ܥ௞←௠ Set of all nodes in network ݇ that depend on 
the nodes in network ݉ (݉ ≠ ݇) to operate
ܦ௞→௠ Set of nodes in network ݇ that the operation of 
the nodes in network ݉(݉ ≠ ݇) depend on
ܨ௜,௝
௞→௠ Set of ordered pairs (݅, ݆) associated with node 
݅ ∈ ܦ௞→௠ and node ݆ ∈ ܥ௠←௞, and node ݆ is 
operational only when the demand of flow of 
node ݅ in network ݇ can be fully satisfied
ܤ௉ Protection budget
ܤ஺ Attack budget
ܿ௟
௞,௉ Cost of protecting link ݈ in network ݇
ܿ௟
௞,஺ Cost of attacking link ݈ in network ݇
ݓ௞ Weight factor for the resilience of network ݇
Decision variables
ݕ௟
௞ Binary variable that is equal to 1 if link ݈ in 
network ݇ is protected, 0 otherwise
ݔ௟
௞ Binary variable that is equal to 0 if link ݈ is 
attacked, 1 otherwise
௟݂
௞ Flow on link ݈ in network ݇
ݏ௡
௞ Flow generation at node ݊ ∈ ܰ௞ in network ݇
݀௡
௞ Flow satisfied at node ݊ ∈ ܰ௞ in network ݇
ߜ௜௝
௞→௠ Interdependency variable that is equal to 1 if 
the interdependency from node ݅ in network ݇ 
to node ݆ in network ݉ works normally, 0 
otherwise
The mathematical formulation of the DAD model for 
optimizing interdependent CIs resilience against intelligent 
attacks is: 
max
࢜
min
࢞
max
࢕∈ॹ(࢜)
෍ ቆݓ௞
∑ ݀௡௞௡∈ேೖ
∑ መ݀௡௞௡∈ேೖ
ቇ
௞∈ࣄ
 ????
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Subject to: 
First level (protection) constraints: 
෍ ෍ ܿ௟
௞,௉
ݕ௟
௞
௟∈௅ೖ
≤ ܤ௉ 
௞∈ࣄ
 ????
ݕ௟
௞ ∈ {0,1}, ∀݈ ∈ ܮ௞, ݊ ∈ ܰ௞, ݇ ∈ ࣄ ????
Second level (attack) constraints: 
෍ ෍ ܿ௟
௞,஺
൫1 − ݔ௟
௞൯
௟∈௅ೖ
≤ ܤ஺ 
௞∈ࣄ
 ????
ݔ௟
௞ ∈ {0,1}, ∀݈ ∈ ܮ௞, ݇ ∈ ࣄ ????
Third level (response) constraints: 
ݏ௡
௞ − ෍ ௟݂
௞
(௟∈௅ೖ|௢(௟)ୀ௡)
+ ෍ ௟݂
௞
(௟∈௅ೖ|ௗ(௟)ୀ௡)
− ݀௡
௞ = 0 , ∀݊
∈ ܰ௞, ݇ ∈ ࣄ 
????
−݂̅௟
௞ൣݔ௟
௞൫1 − ݕ௟
௞൯ + ݕ௟
௞൧
≤ ௟݂
௞ ≤ ݂̅௟
௞ ൣݔ௟
௞൫1 − ݕ௟
௞൯ + ݕ௟
௞൧, ∀݈
∈ ܮ௞, ݇ ∈ ࣄ 
????
0 ≤ ݏ௡
௞ ≤ ̅ݏ௡
௞, ∀݊ ∈ ܰ௞, ݇ ∈ ࣄ ????
0 ≤ ݀௡
௞ ≤ መ݀௡
௞, ∀݊ ∈ ܰ௞, ݇ ∈ ࣄ ?????
݀௜
௞ = ߜ௜௝
௞→௠ መ݀
௜
௞, ∀(݅, ݆) ∈ ܨ௜,௝
௞→௠, ݇ ∈ ࣄ ?????
ݏ௝
௠ ≤ ߜ௜௝
௞→௠̅ݏ௝
௠, ∀(݅, ݆) ∈ ܨ௜,௝
௞→௠, ݇ ∈ ࣄ ?????
௝݀
௠ ≤ ߜ௜௝
௞→௠ መ݀
௝
௠, ∀(݅, ݆) ∈ ܨ௜,௝
௞→௠, ݇ ∈ ࣄ ?????
−ߜ௜௝
௞→௠݂̅௟
௠ ≤ ௟݂
௠ ≤ ߜ௜௝
௞→௠݂̅௟
௠, ∀(݅, ݆) ∈ ܨ௜,௝
௞→௠, ݈ ∈
ܮ௝
௠,௡௕௥
, ݇ ∈ ࣄ  
?????
A. First Level − Defender’s Protection Problem 
In the defender’s protection planning phase, the system 
defender makes investment decisions for hardening weak 
components in the interdependent CIs with the objective of 
maximizing the system performance under the worst case 
attack, as expressed by Eq. 2). A protected component is 
assumed to become invulnerable to damage, meaning that it 
remains operating even under attack. For simplicity, this 
paper focuses only on the protections (and attacks) of 
network links, but the approach can be easily extended to 
account for the protections (and attacks) of other components. 
The cost of protecting a link ݈ in network ݇ is denoted as ܿ௟
௞,௉,
and the protection budget is denoted as ܤ௉ , as described by 
Constraint 3). Constraint 4) enforces the binary nature 
of the protection variables: ݕ௟௞ = 1 if link ݈ in network ݇ is 
protected, 0 otherwise. 
B. Second Level – Attacker’s Problem 
The attacker’s choice of the components (links) to target 
is described by the second-level attack problem, which is 
parameterized in terms of the first-level variables ݕ௟௞ . The 
attack decision is modeled by binary variable ݔ௟௞ , which is 
equal to 0 if link ݈  in network ݇  is attacked, and ݔ௟௞ = 1
otherwise. The attacker aims to minimize the best-response 
system resilience, which is determined in the third level 
defender’s response problem, presented in Section 2.3. The 
attack budget is denoted as ܤ஺  and enforced by Constraint 
5), where ܿ௟
௞,஺  represents the cost of attacking link ݈  in 
network  ݇ . Constraint 6) ensures the integrality of the 
attack variables. 
C. Third Level − Defender’s Response Problem 
The defender’s response to the attack is modeled in the 
third-level problem, where the defender aims to mitigate the 
system resilience loss caused by the attack, i.e. to maximize 
system resilience via re-dispatching the network flows. The 
flow re-dispatch depends on the protection decisions in the 
first phase and the attacker’s decisions in the second phase.
The operation of each CI system modeled by network flows 
is described by Constraints 7)- 10). Constraint 7)
guarantees flow conservation at each node. Constraint 8)
limits the flow across link ݈ in network ݇ to its capacity. The 
term ݔ௟௞൫1 − ݕ௟௞൯ + ݕ௟௞ in 8) models the operation status 
of link ݈ in network ݇ , ensuring that link ݈ is always 
operating, i.e., it is equal to 1 if i) it is protected ݕ௟௞ = 1 or ii) 
it is neither protected ݕ௟௞ = 0 nor attacked ݔ௟௞ = 1, and link ݈
is offline if it is attacked ݔ௟௞ = 1 while not being protected 
ݕ௟
௞ = 0, i.e., it is equal to 0. Constraint 9) bounds the 
output of flow generation at node ݊  in network ݇  to its 
capacity, and 10) ensures that the real satisfied demand 
cannot exceed the required demand for each node. 
Physical interdependencies among different CIs are also 
considered. The physical interdependency is modeled by 
defining a set of ordered node pairs (݅, ݆)  associated with 
node ݅ in one CI network and node ݆ in another CI network, 
where node ݆ is operational if the flow demand of node ݅ is 
fully satisfied [27, 28]. Then, we use a binary variable ߜ௜௝௞→௠
to represent the physical interdependency from node ݅  in 
network ݇  to node ݆  in network  ݉ , and ߜ௜௝௞→௠ = 1  if the 
interdependency works normally and ߜ௜௝௞→௠ = 0 otherwise. 
For each ordered node pair (݅, ݆) ∈ ܨ௜,௝௞→௠, the demand level 
at node ݅ in network ݇ is either zero or fully satisfied, 
depending on whether their interdependency relation can 
work normally, as described by Constraint 11). For each 
node ݆ in the ordered pair (݅, ݆) ∈ ܨ௜,௝௞→௠, the flow generation
is bounded by zero or its generation capacity, as stated by 
Constraint 12), and its demand level is bounded by zero or 
the required demand, as stated by Constraint 13 .
Furthermore, if node ݆ is damaged, the flow on the attached 
links is zero, as described by Constraint 14
III. SOLUTION ALGORITHM
The max-min-max formulation 2)- 14) of Section 2 
configures a mixed-integer nonlinear tri-level programming 
problem. Due to the presence of binary variables ߜ௜௝௞→௠  in
the third level, the second and third level min-max problems 
cannot be merged into a single min problem using the KKT 
conditions (or the strong duality) of the third level max 
problem [29]. Therefore, solution methods that depend on 
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the gradual reconstruction of the upper stage problem using 
dual information from the lower stage are inapplicable [23, 
25]. 
We adopt a recently developed algorithm, called the 
“Nested Column-and-Constraint Generation” (NC&CG) 
method [30], which is proven to be effective in dealing with 
mixed integer programming recourse problems [23, 25]. A
general overview of this algorithm is presented in Figure 1.
The problem is decomposed into an outer-level master 
problem and an outer-level subproblem, which iteratively 
exchange primal decision variables until convergence to an 
optimal solution. The outer-level subproblem provides the 
attacker’s optimum plan and can be expanded into a min-
max-max formulation by separating the binary variables 
ߜ௜௝
௞→௠  and other continuous variables ௟݂௞, ݏ௡௞  and ݀௡௞  in the 
third level problem. Thus, the outer-level subproblem can be 
solved by decomposing it into an inner-level master problem 
and an inner-level subproblem and by applying a cutting 
plane method. 
Figure 1. Flow diagram of the NC&CG algorithm 
The detailed formulations of the outer-level and inner-
level problems are omitted for simplicity and because of the 
limitation of space. The interested readers are referred to [23, 
25] for similar formulations and to [30] for the detailed 
mathematical derivations, proofs and analysis. 
IV. CASE STUDY
This section presents a case study involving 
interdependent power and water systems, adapted from [27];
the network layouts of the two systems are shown in Figure 2.
The interdependency relations are described as follows: the 
water node w8 depends on the power demand node p11; w7 
depends on node p10; node w1 depends on node p4; node 
w3 depends on node p9; the power generation node p1 
depends on the water demand node w9 [27]. 
Figure 2. Layout of the interdependent power and water systems [27] 
The proposed algorithm is implemented by the IBM 
ILOG CPLEX [31] and the calculations are performed on a 
laptop with Intel (R) Core (TM) 2.6 GHz and 8GB memory. 
This study assumes that protecting one link in the 
interdependent CIs needs one unit of protection resources 
and attacking one link takes one unit of attack budget. The 
weighting factor is set as 0.5 for the resilience of each 
interdependent system.  
Figure 3. The combined system resilience associated with the worst-case, 
the second-worst through the fifth-worst attacks for each attack budget 
First, when there is no defense investment, namely, 
ܤ௉ = 0 . Figure 3 shows the combined power and water 
systems resilience associated with the worst attack scenarios, 
and the second worst (i.e., rank order 2) through fifth-worst 
(i.e., rank order 5) combination of system resilience for each 
attack budget. These second-worst through fifth-worst results 
were obtained by adding a new constraint that eliminates the 
previous solution. From the Figure, it is possible to see that 
the combined system resilience generally decreases as the 
attack budget increases for the worst case attack, which is 
expected. Furthermore, the second-worst attacks do not 
necessarily have strictly larger resilience than the worst cases, 
e.g., for the cases ܤ஺ = 1, 4  and 5. In other words, the 
identified worst-case scenarios are not unique but are 
accompanied by some equally bad ones, implying that 
defending against only one of the worst cases is not likely to 
improve the system resilience. 
Second, when the defense investment is considered, we 
solve the DAD model for different combinations of 
protection budget ܤ௉  and attack budget ܤ஺. Figure 4 shows 
the combined power and water resilience as a function of the 
attack budget ܤ஺ under different ܤ௉ . From the Figure, it can 
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be seen that in the case of no defense, the resilience 
decreases almost linearly with the increase of ܤ஺, which can 
be mitigated by increasing the protection budget ܤ௉ , i.e., 
ܤ௉ = 2, 4, 6 and 8. However, due to the non-uniqueness of 
the worst case attack for some attack budgets, the 
improvement of system resilience is not always promising. 
For example, the combined system resilience is increased by 
only 2.3% when ܤ௉  is increased from 0 to 2 for ܤ஺ = 1 ,
compared to the average improvement of 28.4% for other 
attack scenarios under the same increase of ܤ௉. 
Figure 4. Interdependent power and water systems 
Then, we investigate the importance of considering 
interdependency in system defense. In practice, a 
coordinated defense agency for different CIs may not exist. 
Thus, each system makes its own protection decisions 
without considering the interdependencies. To investigate 
this case, we assume there is a governor who distributes the 
defense budget evenly to the power and water systems, and 
each of them protects itself separately without considering 
the interdependencies among them, while the attacker 
disrupts the two systems by recognizing the 
interdependencies. We call this strategy as “separate 
protection” to differentiate it from the “coordinated 
protection” where the interdependent systems are protected 
as a whole. Figure 5(a) shows the combined power and water 
system resilience as a function of the attack budget ܤ஺  for 
the separate protection and the coordinated protection when 
the protection budget ܤ௉ = 4. It is clearly shown that the 
combined resilience values in the case of separate protection 
are always smaller than that in the case of coordinated 
protection. The difference of the combined system resilience 
between the two cases can reflect the importance of 
considering interdependencies in interdependent CIs 
protection. Figure 5(b) presents the difference of the 
combined system resilience between the two cases for 
different protection budget ܤ௉ . From this Figure, it can be 
seen that when ܤ௉  is relatively small, the difference of the 
combined system resilience is relatively insignificant, e.g., 
under or around 0.1 when ܤ௉ = 2; when ܤ௉  increases, the 
difference becomes increasingly significant. These results 
highlight the significance of protecting interdependent CIs as 
a whole against intentional attacks, especially when the 
protection budget is relatively high. 
Figure 5. (a) The combined system resilience curves as a function of the 
attack budget ܤ஺ for the separate protection and the coordinated protection 
when ܤ௉ = 4; (b) The combined resilience difference between the separate 
protection and the coordinated protection as a function of the attack budget 
ܤ஺ when ܤ௉ = 2, 4, 6 and 8. 
Finally, Figure 6 reports the computation times of the 
adopted NC&CG algorithm for solving the proposed model. 
It can be observed that the computation burden is relatively 
light for small attacks, e.g.,  ܤ஺ = 1, 2, 3 , and it becomes 
heavy when the attack budget ܤ஺ increases. Besides, the 
computation time is relatively increased for certain values of 
the protection budget  ܤ௉ , e.g., ܤ௣ = 3, 4, 5 . However, the 
computation time is overall acceptable (< 300 seconds) for 
the proposed system planning problem, which can be solved 
offline. 
Figure 6. Computation times of the solution algorithm 
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented an adapted DAD model for the 
optimal allocation of defensive resources in interdependent 
CIs for resilience against intentional attacks. To the best of 
our knowledge, it is the first tri-level DAD model presented 
for interdependent CIs resilience under intentional attacks. 
To address the computational challenge of the proposed 
mixed-integer nonlinear tri-level programming, a recently 
developed decomposition-based two-layer cutting plane 
algorithm, called NC&CG, has been adopted. A case study 
has been performed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
proposed approach. This has allowed to also highlight the 
significance of considering interdependencies among 
different CIs when considering interdependent CIs defense.  
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